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Intra-Union Flexibility of Non-ETS Emission Reduction
Obligations in the European Union
Introduction
The European Union has proposed greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for the year 2020 (CEC 2008b) . There are a total of 28 targets: one Europe-wide target for emissions covered by the European Trading System (ETS) for carbon dioxide emission permits, and 27 targets (one per Member State) for the remaining greenhouse gases. 1 The initially proposed targets were chosen such that the aggregate emission reduction target would be met in a cost-effective manner. 2 That is, abatement costs are equal at the margin, between ETS and non-ETS and between
Member States. However, this equalization is done ex ante. Without a trading mechanism, it may be that ex post marginal costs differ from one another, if the model or the scenario deviate from reality. Moreover, targets were later adjusted for political reasons. It would therefore be advisable to introduce some form of fungibility between ETS and non-ETS targets even if, given the approximately cost-effective initial allocation of targets, one would not expect that such fungibility would be much used.
Three Member States tabled proposals for flexibility in meeting the non-ETS targets.
The Irish government is particularly concerned about the costs of meeting its non-ETS target. It therefore proposed that a government of any Member State would be allowed to purchase ETS permits to offset its excess non-ETS emissions -that is, there is one-directional fungibility from ETS to non-ETS. The Polish government has the opposite concern. It argues that the costs outside the ETS are likely to be lower than inside, and it proposed that Member States be allowed to sell non-ETS emission allowances in the ETS. The Swedish government proposed that ETS and non-ETS be kept separate, but that non-ETS emission allocations be tradable between Member 1 There are also energy targets, but these are disregarded in this note. 2 Note that the European Union only mentions the words "fair and equitable" (CEC 2008b) . I assume that they first minimized the total costs and then allocated the effort equitably. This follows the principle that one first maximizes the size of the pie before distributing its pieces (Coase 1960) . If this principle is not followed, it is possible to reduce everyone's abatement costs and it cannot possibly be fair to impose unnecessary costs (Roemer 1996) .
States. Together, these three proposals constitute a single market for all emissions in the European Union. Separately, the three alternative proposals move towards a single market, but do not reach it. Still, each of the three proposals cannot lower welfare, and probably increase. In this paper, I evaluate the three proposals, and their impact on (the distribution of) emission reduction costs.
Although besides the topic of the paper, the calibration of the simple model used here to the results of the impact assessment of the European Commission reveals a number of results that are interesting in their own right -and which cast further doubt either on the technical competence of the European Commission or on the wisdom of making important decisions in haste and without scrutiny (Tol 2007) .
Much has been written about the potential of trade in emission permits to reduce the costs of abatement (Manne & Richels 1996; Montgomery 1972; Pizer 2002 in EU climate policy, particularly the overlapping regulation in emissions and energy (Boehringer, Koschel, & Moslener 2008) . This paper is focused on the current proposals to enhance the flexibility of meeting the EU's non-ETS emission targets.
Section 2 sets out a simple model, based on (Rehdanz, Tol, & Wetzel 2006; Tol & Rehdanz 2008) . Section 3 discusses the calibration of the model and its application.
Section 4 concludes.
The model

Model structure and properties
Let us consider a market for tradable emission reduction permits with I countries.
Emission reduction costs C are quadratic. Each country solves the problem:
R is proportional emission reduction; Y is gross domestic product; P denotes the amount of emission permits bought or sold; π is the emission permit price; assuming a perfect market, all companies face the same price; E are the emissions; A are the allocated emission permits; that is, if a country emits more than has been allocated, E>A, it will have to reduce emissions or buy permits on the market; α is a parameter; countries are indexed by i. If a country's allocation exceeds its emissions, E<A, the optimization problem is:
We assume that the country sells its hot air P=E-A, and in addition reduces emissions by RE which it sells at the market for πRE. Fixing A, we in fact assume that countries with hot air do not have market power. Countries with hot air are indexed by j.
Countries without emission reduction targets are excluded from the market.
The first order conditions of (1) are:
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. This is a system with 3(I+J) equations and 3(I+J)+1 unknowns, but we also have that aggregate supply must equal aggregate demand, that is
which allows us to solve for the permit price π as well. (2) solves as:
except that the first E j -A j permits are available without emission reduction costs.
(3b) ; 2 2
So, the permit price goes up if the emission reduction obligation increases or if the costs of emission reduction increase. All companies face the same marginal costs of emission reduction, and the trade-off between reducing emissions in-house and buying or selling permits is driven by the ratio of marginal emission reduction costs and the permit price. The modelled market behaves as expected. Note that the solution without the market in emission permits (P i =0) is trivial.
If country I+1 joins the market, the price becomes Table A2 ), which suggests that there are further problems with the data of Capros et al. (2008) . Table A1 for the total emissions, and Table A2 for the ETS share.
For each of the four baselines, I calibrate the unit cost parameters α i for emission reduction in the ETS by assuming that these are proportional to the square root of the relative carbon efficiency of the economy (Rehdanz, Tol, & Wetzel 2006) , as follows: (5) 1.57 0.17 min
Furthermore, I assume that π=€40/tCO 2 in 2020 (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & Tasios 2008) . See Table A3 .
The unit cost parameters α i for non-ETS emissions are set such that the cost-effective non-ETS emission reduction targets of (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & Tasios 2008 ) are cost-effective in this model as well. See Table A4 . For EUmid, there is a variant: I calibrate the unit cost parameters such that the marginal cost is as reported in the impact assessment of the European Commission (CEC 2008a). 8 I refer to this scenario as EUprice. The marginal costs differ substantially from the assumed ETS price of €40/tCO 2 . That is, the political adjustments of the cost-effective targets were substantial. Polish plus Swedish proposal), the permit price would be between €34 and €36/tCO 2 eq. This price would apply to all emissions in all Member States. Table 3 shows that there is indeed a net sale of emission permits into the ETS. however, that the non-ETS market has 27 buyers and sellers only. This may imply market power. Table A5 shows the trading pattern. With 14 sellers and 13 buyers, an equal market share would be 7 to 8%. Two sellers stand out (Poland, Romania) and two buyers (Italy, Spain). These countries may be able to exert a degree of monopoly or monopsony power. That is, Poland and Romania may withhold some of their emissions from the market in order to drive up the price, while Italy and Spain may suppress their demand in order to reduce the price. The results presented in this paper do not consider this. The ability to exert market power depends on the structure of the market, no proposals for which have yet been made. However, a continuous double auction may be the most appropriate choice in situations like this (Carlen 2003) . Table 4 shows the total costs of emission reduction, here presented as a percent of GDP in 2020. Each of the four proposals improves welfare in each calibration, as they should. In each calibration, the Irish proposal has the smallest effect, followed by the Polish proposal, the Swedish proposal, and (as expected) full trade. is multiplied by a factor 1.14. Third, I increase the unit cost of non-ETS emission reduction in Ireland so as to match a recent projection for that country (Cambridge Econometrics 2008). Fourth, I increase the unit cost of non-ETS emission reduction in all Member States by the same factor (3.1). Fifth, I increase emissions as in the second scenario and reduction costs as in the fourth scenario. Table 6 shows the effect of the price of emission permits in 2020, Table 7 the impact on total costs, and Table 8 the net demand on ETS emissions. As I either increased the emission reduction obligation, or the costs of abatement, or both, it is no surprise that both the marginal and total cost of emission reduction go up. As the perturbations of emissions and costs are in the non-ETS sectors, the ETS is not affected if there is no fungibility between ETS and non-ETS. As emission reduction outside the ETS becomes more expensive, the Polish proposal loses much of its appeal -most of the hot air in the EUmid scenario disappears, with only a small amount left in Bulgaria. Table 7 shows that the costs escalate in the Polish proposal almost as much as in case of the current ETS. Costs also escalate in the Swedish proposal, but less.
Results
Results for the base case
The Irish proposal, on the other hand, behaves much like full trade. Indeed, in the full trade case, there would be less reason to sell non-ETS emission to the ETS (as in the Polish proposal) and less reason to trade non-ETS emissions between Member States (as in the Swedish proposal). Instead, the market would seek to buy more ETS emission permits to offset non-ETS emissions (as in the Irish proposal). Table 8 highlights this. Figure 1 shows the impact on the total costs of emission reduction if unit emission reduction costs are either higher of lower than in the base case. 11 The case with higher unit emission reduction costs is described above. The case with lower unit emission reduction costs uses the inverse ratio -that is, the unit costs of the base case are multiplied with the ratio of base case costs to high case costs. In Figure 1 , the costs for each of the five policy scenarios are normalized to unity for the unit costs calibrated to PRIMES. If unit costs are higher, total costs go up in all policy scenarios.
Costs increase most under the Polish proposal, and least under the Irish proposal -as 
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, I discuss the implications of intra-EU flexibility in meeting the non-ETS emission reduction targets, using a simple model calibrated to the impact assessment of the European Commission DG Environment (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & Tasios 2008) . The following results emerge.
Firstly, the non-ETS emission allocation is advertised by the European Commission as approximately cost-effective, but the analysis here shows substantial deviation from a uniform carbon price between ETS and non-ETS, and between non-ETS emissions in different Member States.
Secondly, it appears that at least two countries have received non-ETS allocations that exceed their emissions as projected by CEC DG Environment (Capros, Mantzos,
Papandreou, & Tasios 2008).
Thirdly, the Irish proposal to allow Member States to purchase ETS permits to offset excess non-ETS emissions would increase the price of emission permits by less than 10%. The Polish proposal to allow Member States to sell non-ETS emissions into the ETS would decrease the price of emission permits by more than 15%. The Swedish proposal to allow Member States to sell non-ETS emission allocations to one another would have non-ETS emission permits trading at a price that is 25% or more lower than the ETS price. The first-best solution, a single market for all emissions, would settle on a price that is at least 10% below the projected ETS price of €40/tCO 2 eq.
From a welfare perspective, the single ETS plus non-ETS market performs best. The
Polish and Swedish proposals perform roughly the same, and better than the Irish proposal, which in turn outperforms current policy. However, from the perspective of maintaining a strong carbon price signal in the ETS sector, the Irish proposal is the preferred option. The results presented here come with all the usual caveats. The numbers depend on a range of assumptions, each of which is uncertain and disputable. It would therefore be recommendable to reproduce the analysis here with other models. More complicated models may find that the model used here is oversimplified. However, the qualitative results are probably robust as they follow intuitively from the structure of the problem and the alternative policies. There are also things that were not considered in this paper. Chief among these are potential market power under the Swedish proposal, and the ability to purchase emission permits outside the European Union (through the Clean Development Mechanism or its successor), including the proposed limitations imposed on that as well as the option to trade CDM allocations. These issues are deferred to future research.
In sum, the European Union has created a potential economic problem by imposing 28 emission reduction targets of varying strictness. If for political reasons it is not feasible to replace the 28 targets with a single one, then the Irish proposal to allow Member States to purchase ETS emission permits to offset excess non-ETS emissions emerges as a policy that would maintain, or even strengthen the integrity of the ETS while at the same time controlling the costs on non-ETS emission reduction. Table 8 . The net change in total available emission permits (in million metric tones of carbon dioxide) in the ETS for the EUmid calibration and five variations that have higher non-ETS emissions in Ireland and the entire EU, higher costs in Ireland and the entire EU, or both higher non-ETS emissions and higher costs (entire EU only). 
EUmid Higher emissions Higher costs
Both Ireland EU27 Ireland EU27 EU27 ETS
